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Bioethics: 
Whence Do We Derive the Norms? 
Sean O'Reilly, M.D., F.R.C.P. 
Dr. O'Reilly, author of the book Our Name Is Peter, is a professor 
of neurology and direc tor of the post-doctoral research training pro-
gram in neurobiology at the George Washington University Medical 
Center. 
The Christian, especially the informed Catholic, has a certain diffi· 
culty when it comes to a question such as that posed in the title of 
this presentation. He is in much the same position as the innkeeper, 
Humphrey Pump, in Chesterton's allegorical novel, The Flying Inn. 
Pump had difficulty in composing a fanciful poem about the meander-
ings of the "The Road to Roundabout." " I write under a great dis-
advantage," he said. "You see, I know why the road curves about!" 
So it is with the Catholic scientist or physician. He knows, or 
should know, the real answer; he can engage in speculation about 
possible answers only as a didactic exercise or by way of dialog with 
those who profess not to know and to have open minds about the 
matter. 
It is in the interest of such a didactic exercise and a possible dialog 
that I chose the above title. 
I hope to clarify certain terms and expressions, and indicate some 
approaches to refutation of the answers to the question provided by 
materialists, rationalists and secular humanists . I will affirm a thesis, 
largely by way of propositional statements. In this way I hope to 
clarify the Catholic Christian answer to this question and lay a suitable 
groundwork for the speakers who will follow me. 
Bioethics is that branch of ethics having to do with human actions 
in relation to life and death issues. I said " life and death," though 
etymology of the term "bioethics" refers only to life . For death is a 
part of life, a necessary part so far as physical life and the spiritual life 
are concerned. It is all too often a part, though not a necessary one, of 
the emotional life and the moral life of each human being. 
I also said ethics and bioethics are concerned with human actions -
not all human actions, but only those which are specifically human, 
such as intellection and Willing. Furthermore, of these specifically 
human acts, only those which are deliberate acts of the free will, 
placed with knowledge and advertence, can be morally responsible or 
November, 1979 347 
irresponsible. Thus ethics and bioethics are concerned with voluntary 
human acts . 
Immediately we run into a road block in our attempted dialog with 
agnostics, notoriously those who are not true agnostics in the proper 
sense of the term, but really ideologs - materialistic, deterministic, 
atheistic, dogmatic - as only they can be! "All matter, " they will say, 
"is made up of the same fundamental particles, whose properties and 
actions can be elucidated and understood only by application of rigor-
ous scientific method - all matter, including living matter. All man's 
actions, his behavior, will ultimately be explainable in terms of his 
genes, his constituent molecules, atoms and subatomic particles. There 
is no free will , no such thing as spirit. How could there be , since 
experimental science, which alone has access to the reality of things, 
can find no evidence of such?" 
A Commonly Prevalent View 
Not all scientists or even pseudo-scientists are such gross materialists. 
The most commonly prevalent view of man among agnostic scientists 
is humanism, appropriately labeled secular humanism. One such 
humanist put it in a nutshell at a conference on ethical issues in 
genetics a few years ago. 
Some of us , though profoundly awed by the unive rsal as we appreciate it, 
do not believe in a supernatural God and we reject divine au thority for an 
ethical code. Nor can we accept the idea of an e ternal , universal , absolute 
ethics imprinted in the conscience of man .. . . It seems to me, therefore , 
that the authority for ethical decisions, for decisions as to what is right and 
good, come from man himself, from his own choices, individually and in 
groups .... The touchstone of man's choices, of his ethical choices, is 
simply his judgment of whether it is right and good for man. Man is the 
measure of all things! 1 
Now, what could you say in response to the first kind of infidel -
the kind who believes that all man 's acts and actions are explainable in 
mechanistic terms - in terms of probability theory, considering his 
genetic make-up, acting and reacting to his environment? 
You might try what could be called the Christopher Derrick 
approach - well-reasoned irony. You might say to your materialistic 
scientific secular humanist: "If you believe all you say about behavior 
being exclusively determined by subatomic, atomic and molecular 
actions and reactions, all going on according to established scientific 
principles and laws; and if you really do not believe there is such a 
thing as moral evil, but only lesser and greater goods, how could you 
possibly complain if I decided to choose what you should consider 
merely a lesser good? What if my chemical reactions compelled me to 
knock you off because your obstinate schizophrenic rejection of real-
ity is evil in my eyes? 
I know it would be morally wrong for me to do so. But how could 
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you know? I submit you could not, if you do not accept the moral 
order as a fact. I say you could not ever know if my action could be 
explained in terms of my genes, or my sociological data, or the 'ran-
dom walk' of my molecules which, somehow, in some way as yet 
unknown to science, had been converted into a murderous directional-
ity. And even if you understood the chemistry and the biophysics of 
my act, what sanction could you invoke against me if you do not 
believe in God? Does it, in fact, matter one whit what I do to you if 
there is no God?" 
There is a second approach, if your friend is at all capable of logical 
thought; it is particularly directed to the secular humanist. This is an 
approach used very effectively by Arthur Dyck, professor of popula-
tion ethics at Harvard, in his lectures and writings. It consists in a 
logical analysis of the various ethical systems of thought thrown up by 
rationalism, scientism and secular humanism - from utilitarian theory 
to situation ethics. All these can be shown to be involved ultimately in 
a fundamental logical contradiction, namely, that moral goods can be 
determined and evaluated by non-moral means. There are many other 
contradictions in such systems but we do not have the time to discuss 
them. 
I want to put before you a third approach for your consideration, an 
approach directed to both materialists and secular humanists. 
If we accepted for didactic purposes and for the sake of dialog the 
equation of "science" with "experimental science" and if rigorous 
scientific method is the only way to knowledge of reality, then we 
would have to assert that science in such a restricted sense cannot have 
anything to say about such abstract things as good, evil, truth, justice, 
virtue, love. To hold otherwise would be unscientific, and we should 
expect the majority of honest scientists to agree with us on this. If so, 
they may be willing to listen further. For we must go further and 
affirm that positive experimental science, of its very nature, cannot 
contribute to moral theory or to bioethics specifically. 
Two Reasons Cited 
This is so for two good and sufficient reasons: 
1. Positive science knows nothing about freedom . 
2. For "science," absolute truth is unobtainable; in fact, it does not 
exist. 
We mean, of course, human freedom, since science does speak of 
"freedom" and "degrees of freedom"; this however, at best consists of 
the "random walk" of probability theory. Concerning these two 
notions, truth and freedom, we can say that if there is no absolute 
truth, the best we could come up with would be a relativistic bio-
ethics. If there is no human freedom, if man has no free will there can 
be no ethics ; no ethical question arises or could arise. 
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The notion of freedom, therefore, is of prior importance in ethics. 
One must come to grips with this question of human freedom, because 
if we do not understand it correctly, we can only be led into a quag-
mire of moral relativism, subjectivism and downright contradiction. 
On the subject of liberty and freedom, all I want to say is that it is 
becoming more and more evident that the confusion of what passes 
for modern ethical thought, the degradation of the medical profession, 
the secularization of Catholic higher education and the perversion of 
Catholic moral philosophy and theology, are due in large part to tacit 
acceptance of Hegel's false definition of human freedom. 
I want to conclude this presentation with a series of summary prop-
ositional statements: 
Ethics is concerned with realities of an order which transcends the 
physical order of the universe - an order that is outside the purview 
of science, as science has been defined by scientists. This order is 
called the moral order; it is an order of realitites called values. 
The fundamental values in the moral order - goodness, truth, hon-
esty, sincerity , fidelity, etc. - are immediate "givens." What this 
means is that man, by unaided reason, can know the general principles 
of right and wrong conduct in their fundamental and simplest applica-
tions: it is possible for a pagan to be honest or dishonest, loyal or dis-
loyal, selfish or unselfish , truthful or a liar. The moral values are realities 
that are important - important for man if he is to live a truly human 
life. Above all they are important in themselves: they exist whether 
man chooses to accept them or not. 
The values in question, once grasped, evoke a response, a categorical 
obligation which impresses itself in such a way that man cannot ignore 
or reject it without uneasiness. 2 
Man Free to Choose 
Man is free to ignore the obligation: he is free to choose. He is not 
free to choose equally freely between good and evil. In practical 
terms, this means he seeks to justify his choice of evil by conceiving of 
it or presenting it to himself as a "good." But he is free to choose, or 
else the moral order would not apply to him : no ethical question 
would or could arise. 
Grasping these immediate "givens" is one thing. It is another to 
apply them to the life and actions of man, to interpret what the 
obligation imposed by moral values means in practice. How should 
man act so as to secure these values? Obviously there is need for a set 
of principles, rules, norms, whereby man may judge his actions in 
relation to moral values. Hence ethics is a normative science. We 
rejected positive science, materialism, secular humanism as the source 
of ethical norms. Whence then do we derive the norms? For the Chris-
tian there is only one answer - God. 
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The moral order essentially presupposes God. Like the physical 
order of the universe , it can lead man to at least a knowledge of the 
existence of God as the source of these realities and of the sanctions 
implied in the notion of obligation. 
However, an explicit knowledge and acknowledgment of the exist-
ence of God are not necessary for moral choice. That is to say, there is 
a natural moral order which obligates man; a natural moral philosophy 
can be developed as the ancient Greeks did. A natural moral law exists 
which binds all humans insofar as they are free human beings. 
There is, however, yet another order - the supernatural order-
which transcends the natural moral order. It is an order of which man 
has always seemed to be dimly and confusedly aware. This supernat-
ural order, the order of spirit, has been revealed to man by God. The 
knowledge so imparted and the obligations which stem from it do not 
negate the natural order; rather, the latter is elevated, ennobled and 
perfected. 
This public and formal revelation of God, recorded in the Old Test-
ament and the New, culminated in the Person, the life and teachings, 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Second Person of the 
Blessed Trinity , Who became Man. He entrusted that revelation to the 
Church which He founded on Peter and the other Apostles, that 
Church which has continued the Incarnation in time, in a real, though 
mystical way. 3 
The only true and valid ethics for man, therefore, stems from the 
integral vision of man provided by God's revelation - conserved, inter-
preted and taught by the Church founded by His Son, Our Lord. 
As von Hildebrand says, the one true, valid ethics for man is Chris-
tian ethics. 4 Only such an ethics can begin to provide definitive 
answers to the multifarious moral questions that beset man. It is 
indeed a humanist ethics, but Christian, not secular. It is the only 
ethics that can do justice to man in his entire nature, personal and 
social, because it does justice to God. It can reconcile man to man, 
because it reconciles man to God. 
In God's providence, bioethics of this kind is the straight and nar-
row way leading to eternal life. 
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